Modulation of the composite face effect by unintended emotion cues by Gray, Katie L. H. et al.
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
Research
Cite this article: Gray KLH, Murphy J, Marsh
JE, Cook R. 2017 Modulation of the composite
face effect by unintended emotion cues.
R. Soc. open sci. 4: 160867.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160867
Received: 3 November 2016
Accepted: 23 March 2017
Subject Category:
Psychology and cognitive neuroscience
Subject Areas:
psychology
Keywords:
facial emotion, holistic processing,
composite-face effect, face perception
Author for correspondence:
Katie L. H. Gray
e-mail: k.l.h.gray@reading.ac.uk
Electronic supplementary material is available
online at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.
c.3738158.
Modulation of the
composite face effect by
unintended emotion cues
Katie L. H. Gray1, Jennifer Murphy2,3, Jade E. Marsh1
and Richard Cook2
1School of Psychology and Clinical Language Sciences, University of Reading,
Reading, UK
2Department of Psychology, City, University of London, London, UK
3MRC Social, Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Centre, Institute of Psychiatry,
Psychology, and Neuroscience, King’s College London, London, UK
KLHG, 0000-0002-6071-4588; JM, 0000-0001-8945-3337;
RC, 0000-0003-2370-3086
When upper and lower regions from different emotionless
faces are aligned to form a facial composite, observers
‘fuse’ the two halves together, perceptually. The illusory
distortion induced by task-irrelevant (‘distractor’) halves
hinders participants’ judgements about task-relevant (‘target’)
halves. This composite-face effect reveals a tendency to
integrate feature information from disparate regions of
intact upright faces, consistent with theories of holistic face
processing. However, observers frequently perceive emotion
in ostensibly neutral faces, contrary to the intentions of
experimenters. This study sought to determine whether this
‘perceived emotion’ influences the composite-face effect. In
our first experiment, we confirmed that the composite effect
grows stronger as the strength of distractor emotion increased.
Critically, effects of distractor emotion were induced by weak
emotion intensities, and were incidental insofar as emotion
cues hindered image matching, not emotion labelling per se.
In Experiment 2, we found a correlation between the presence
of perceived emotion in a set of ostensibly neutral distractor
regions sourced from commonly used face databases, and the
strength of illusory distortion they induced. In Experiment 3,
participants completed a sequential matching composite task
in which half of the distractor regions were rated high and
low for perceived emotion, respectively. Significantly stronger
composite effects were induced by the high-emotion distractor
halves. These convergent results suggest that perceived
emotion increases the strength of the composite-face effect
induced by supposedly emotionless faces. These findings have
important implications for the study of holistic face processing
in typical and atypical populations.
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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1. Introduction
Upright faces are thought to be processed holistically, whereby local facial features are integrated into
a unified representation for the purposes of efficient analysis [1–4]. Evidence for this view comes from
the composite-face effect [5–7]. When upper and lower regions from different faces are aligned to form a
facial composite, the two halves appear to ‘fuse’ together, perceptually. The illusory distortion induced
by task-irrelevant (‘distractor’) halves hinders participants’ judgements about task-relevant (‘target’)
halves (for reviews, see [8,9]). However, when composite arrangements are misaligned spatially, or
turned upside-down, the illusion-induced interference is greatly diminished [10,11]. The composite-face
effect reveals a tendency to integrate feature information from disparate regions of intact upright faces,
consistent with theories of holistic face processing [1–4].
Composite fusion is thought to distort the perception of face structure—a semi-permanent, durable
source of facial variation that changes slowly over time [12,13]—leading to biased attributions of facial
identity [7], age [14], gender [15] and attractiveness [16]. However, it is well established that manifest
expressions—a transient source of facial variation [12,13]—also induce strong composite illusions that
interfere with observers’ attribution of facial emotion [5,17,18]. For example, observers are error prone
and slow when asked to name the emotion of a target half when aligned with a distractor half exhibiting
a different emotion, even when the two halves are from the same identity [5].
In recent years, the study of the composite-face effect has been dominated by matching paradigms,
whereby observers are asked to judge whether the target regions in two composite arrangements—
presented simultaneously or sequentially—are identical or not (e.g. [6,11,19–22]). These procedures are
popular because they can be employed with unfamiliar faces (i.e. matching procedures do not necessitate
a familiarization phase) and because they allow authors to compare the composite effects seen with
faces and other classes of non-face object. Matching paradigms effectively demonstrate the presence
of illusory distortion, however, they reveal little about the nature of the distortion induced; the type
or direction of illusory bias is ambiguous. The composite-face arrangements employed are constructed
from emotionally neutral faces, where the actor depicted has been instructed to convey no emotion.
Where observed, composite effects derived from these paradigms are therefore assumed to reflect the
binding of facial structure [8,9].
Crucially, however, observers frequently perceive emotion in ostensibly neutral faces, contrary to the
intention of the actors themselves and experimenters [23]. Capturing valence-free facial expressions is
deceptively difficult; when posing for photos, actors seeking to appear ‘neutral’ often appear anxious,
bored, threatening or cheerful. In addition, it is not always easy to distinguish a stranger’s permanent
facial shape from their transient facial expressions [24–26]. For example, it can be difficult to determine
whether an unfamiliar actor is sad or simply has a mouth that droops at its corners, whether flared
nostrils are a stable facial feature or a display of frustration. Similar effects can also be induced
experimentally by feature displacement. For example, simply increasing the vertical distance between
the eyes and mouth can augment perceptions of sadness, while decreasing this distance makes the same
face appear angry [27].
This study sought to determine how perceived emotion cues influence the composite-face effect.
Previous authors have noted that different sets of composite faces produce effect sizes that vary
considerably [28,29]. To date, however, little is known about the origin of this inter-stimulus variability.
Because image-matching composite paradigms simply require observers to judge whether target halves
are identical or not, interference may be induced by the binding of perceived emotion, facial structure or
both. Given the strength of the composite effects induced by facial emotion [5,17,18], some of the illusory
distortion currently attributed to the binding of facial structure, may in fact be induced by unintended
emotion cues [8,9]. Consistent with this possibility, we describe three complementary experiments which
suggest that subtle emotions perceived by observers exert a striking influence on the strength of the
composite effect.
2. Experiment 1
It is well established that emotional distractors impair explicit emotion judgements made about the
target region (e.g. labelling or categorization), when arrangements are aligned and upright [5,17,18]. It is
unclear, however, whether emotion cues present in the distractor induce ‘incidental’ composite effects;
i.e. illusory distortions that affect image matching, in the absence of an explicit emotion judgement.
This was the possibility we sought to test in our first experiment. Neutral target regions were presented
with task-irrelevant distractor regions, either aligned or misaligned, displaying: (i) no emotion, (ii) weak
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emotion or (iii) strong emotion. Should distractor regions induce similar levels of illusory interference
irrespective of emotion content, it would indicate that the effects obtained using image-matching
paradigms reflect the binding of facial structure only. However, modulation of illusory interference by
the presence of emotion would imply that emotion cues also induce incidental composite interference.
2.1. Material and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-six naive adults completed the experiment (Mage= 20.58 years; s.d.age= 3.17; eight males). Two
participants were replaced having scored 0% correct in one or more of the misaligned conditions. All
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical clearance was granted by the local ethics
committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down in the 6th (2008)
Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave informed consent.
2.1.2. Stimuli
In all the experiments described, upper face halves were used as target regions, and lower face halves
were used as distractors (in line with the prevailing convention [9]). Target regions were taken from 18
neutral faces selected from the Radboud face database [30]. Distractor regions were selected from six
different individuals sourced from the same database. Faces were cropped just above the nostrils. Three
levels of emotion intensity were produced for each distractor identity, yielding 18 distractors in total.
Three of the distractor identities (the happy subset) expressed no emotion, 50% happy and 100% happy.
The remaining three distractor identities (the angry subset) expressed no emotion, 50% angry and 100%
angry. The 50% intensities were created through image morphing completed using MORPHEUS PHOTO
MORPHER v. 3.11 (Morpheus Software, Indianapolis, IN). Facial composites subtended approximately 6°
vertically when viewed at 58 cm. In the misaligned condition, target and distractor halves were offset
horizontally by approximately 3°. A thin grey line (approx. 4 pixels) was inserted in between the target
and distractor to help participants distinguish the to-be-judged regions. The absence of such delineation
may artificially inflate the magnitude of composite-face effects [31].
2.1.3. Procedure
Each trial began with a fixation point, and then presented two composite arrangements sequentially, each
for 200 ms (figure 1a). During an inter-stimulus-interval of 1000 ms, a mask was presented, constructed
from high-contrast greyscale ovals. The target halves could either be identical (50% of trials) or could
differ (50% of trials). Participants made simple image-matching judgements about the targets. An
original matching design was employed whereby the two distractor halves always differed [6,8]. One
distractor was taken from the happy set and one from the angry set (note, this meant that the identity of
the distractor always differed). The allocation of happy and angry distractors to the first and second
arrangements was counterbalanced. In the no emotion condition, distractor halves had 0% emotion;
in the weak emotion condition, distractor halves had 50% emotion; in the strong emotion condition,
distractor halves had 100% emotion. Thus, within each trial, the intensity of the expression was held
constant, but the actual emotion presented in the two arrangements differed. In total, there were 216
experimental trials: 18 randomly selected target pairings× 2 target types (same, different)× 3 levels of
perceived emotion (low, medium, high)× 2 alignments (aligned, misaligned). The different types of trial
were randomly interleaved within four blocks of 54 trials. The experiment was programed in MATLAB
with PSYCHTOOLBOX extensions [32,33].
2.2. Results and discussion
In the original matching design employed in Experiment 1, distractor halves always differ. The composite
illusion is therefore revealed by a disproportionate accuracy cost in the ‘same’ target trials in the
presence of aligned distractor regions. Crucially, the interaction between target type (same, different)
and alignment (aligned, misaligned) was found to vary as a function of emotion (0%, 50%, 100%)
(F2,70= 5.50, p= 0.006, η2p = 0.14), suggesting that the emotion cues presented in the distractor halves
influenced the strength of the composite illusion (figure 1b). Evidence of the composite illusion,
inferred from simple target type× alignment interactions, was found in both the strong (F1,35= 19.11,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.35) and weak emotion conditions (F1,35= 16.85, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.33), but not in the no
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Figure 1. (a) Sequentially presented composite faces were presented in which the distractor half either had 0% emotion, 50% emotion
or 100% emotion. (b) Results from Experiment 1 in the low, moderate and high-emotion conditions. *** denotes p< 0.001, ** denotes
p< 0.01, n.s., non-significant. Error bars denote±1 s.e.m.
emotion condition (F1,35= 1.29, p= 0.26, η2p = 0.04). Further analyses revealed that the overall target
type× alignment× emotion interaction was driven by differences between the no emotion condition
and both the weak (F1,35= 7.49, p= 0.01, η2p = 0.18) and strong (F1,35= 8.48, p= 0.006, η2p = 0.20) emotion
conditions. The interactions in the weak and strong emotion conditions did not differ significantly
(F1,35= 0.33, p= 0.64, η2p = 0.01).
In the no emotion condition, Bonferroni corrected post hoc contrasts indicated no effect of alignment
for either same (t35= 0.92, p= 0.36) or different trials (t35= 0.62, p= 0.54). However, accuracy was greater
for same trials in both the aligned (t35= 3.68, p= 0.001) and misaligned (t35= 5.05, p< 0.001) conditions,
suggesting an underlying response bias to respond ‘same’. In the weak emotion condition, we found
evidence for a composite effect: observers’ accuracy on the same trials was lower when distractors were
aligned, than when misaligned (t35= 3.34, p= 0.002). This effect was reversed for the different trials
(t35= 3.14, p= 0.003). In the strong emotion condition, a classic composite effect was found: once again,
observers’ accuracy on the same trials was lower when distractors were aligned, than when misaligned
(t35= 4.90, p< 0.001), but this was not the case on different trials (t35= 1.32, p= 0.20).
These results highlight the striking influence that emotion cues exert on the strength of the composite
illusion measured using image-matching paradigms. Previous reports have described how incongruous
distractor emotion impairs emotion judgements made about target regions [5,17,18]. However, the
present effects of distractor emotion may be thought of as ‘incidental’ insofar as emotion cues hinder
image matching, not emotion labelling or categorization per se. Importantly, these results confirm that
illusion-induced interference seen on image-matching composite procedures may result from the binding
of face structure or the binding of facial expression.
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Clear and comparable composite illusions were seen when distractor halves depicted strong and
intermediate facial emotion. This suggests that the effect is not driven purely by physical dissimilarities
in the distractor regions, as the physical differences between strong and intermediate emotion were
the same as between intermediate and no emotion conditions. When the distractor halves contained
no emotion, however, we found no evidence of a composite effect. We speculate that the lack of a
composite effect in this condition may be a product of the procedure employed. Interleaving trials
with strong illusory distortion (high emotion) and moderate illusory distortion (intermediate emotion)
may have altered participants’ decision criteria. While some subtle distortion may be seen in the no
emotion condition, it may have been insufficient to elicit ‘different’ responses where participants have
the reasonable expectation that ‘same’ and ‘different’ responses should be made with roughly equal
frequency within a block.
3. Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 confirm that emotion cues present in distractor regions may induce
incidental composite interference, impairing image-matching judgements made about target face
regions. Moreover, it appears that relatively weak emotion cues present in the distractor regions are
sufficient to induce target distortions. In our second experiment, we sought evidence that perceived
emotion in ostensibly ‘neutral’ faces might modulate composite interference in a similar way. If perceived
emotion modulates composite binding, distractor halves rich in perceived emotion should exert more
illusory distortion on target halves. In Experiment 2, we therefore examined the relative ability of 50
distractor halves—all supposedly ‘neutral’—to distort observers’ perception of four target halves, to
determine whether this variability is associated with the presence of perceived emotion. Traditional
composite-face procedures collapse across multiple targets and distractors to derive a single estimate
of observers’ susceptibility to the illusion. To estimate the composite interference induced by individual
distractors, we therefore employed a novel subjective-report paradigm.
3.1. Material and methods
3.1.1. Participants
The emotion rating task was completed by 30 naive adults (Mage= 30.8 years; s.d.age= 8.0; nine males). A
separate group of 46 nave adults (Mage= 46.3 years; s.d.age= 9.1; 16 males) participated in the composite
distortion task. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Ethical clearance was granted
by the local ethics committee and the study was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down
in the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave informed consent.
3.1.2. Stimuli
The 50 distractor halves and four target halves were cropped from 54 male faces sourced from the
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces [34] and the Radboud Faces Database [30]. Importantly, each actor
depicted was posing a neutral expression (i.e. trying not to convey facial emotion). External facial features
were occluded using an oval frame. Faces were cropped just above the nostrils. The distractor and target
halves were presented in greyscale against a mid-grey background. Once again, a thin grey line (approx.
4 pixels) was inserted in between the target and distractor to help participants distinguish the to-be-
judged region. Participants in the rating phase were required to rate each of the 50 distractors for the
presence of five emotions (happiness, anger, fear, sadness and disgust)1 on a 1–100 scale. Each rating
trial presented a single distractor in isolation.
3.1.3. Procedure
Two identical target halves were presented on the left and right side of the display, separated by
approximately 7° of visual angle when viewed at 58 cm. On each trial, the left-hand target was aligned
with one of the 50 distractors to create a facial composite subtending approximately 6° vertically. The
right-hand target was always presented in isolation. Having been told that the targets were physically
identical, participants were required to report the strength of the distortion induced by the distractor
1Surprise was not included as an option in the rating task, as the status of surprise as a basic emotion has been questioned (e.g. [35]).
There is also some evidence that the perceptual representation of surprise behaves differently to that of other facial emotions; e.g.
surprise expressions may not be perceived categorically [36].
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Figure 2. (a) To produce a single estimate of the perceived emotion present in each distractor, we computed its Euclidean distance in
emotion space from the point of absolute neutrality. (b) Examples of facial composites used Experiment 2 constructed with distractors
rated high (top) and low (bottom) in perceived emotion. Observers were required to rate the extent towhich the lower face half distorted
their percept of the upper face half. (c) The correlation between the averagemagnitude of composite distortion and the average distance
of each distractor half from true neutral.
using a slider (from no distortion to substantial distortion, on 1–50 scale). No time limit was imposed.
Each distractor region was paired with four different eye regions, resulting in 200 subjective-report
trials, completed in a randomized order. To help participants familiarize themselves with the nature and
strength of the illusion, they viewed all 200 displays for 3 s each before starting the rating procedure. We
hoped pre-exposure would improve participants’ ability to describe the relative strength of the distortion
on a given trial. The experiment was programed in MATLAB with PSYCHTOOLBOX extensions [32,33].
3.2. Results and discussion
The subjective reports of illusory distortion induced by the distractors, provided by each participant,
were first averaged across the four target halves (to derive the average distortion reported by a given
participant, for each distractor), then averaged across participants (to compute the average distortion
reported by the sample, for each distractor). To produce a single measure of the perceived emotion
present in each distractor, we calculated its Euclidean distance in emotion space2 from the point of
absolute neutrality (figure 2a). Smaller scores indicate that distractors were rated closer to neutral and
therefore contained less perceived emotion. Despite being cropped from ostensibly emotion-neutral
faces, there was considerable variability in the mean distances computed (figure 2b).
Simple correlation analysis (figure 2c) revealed a significant positive relationship (r= 0.38, p= 0.006)
between the degree of perceived emotion (M= 24.73, s.d.= 8.77) and the composite distortion induced
by the distractors (M= 16.86, s.d.= 3.60). Consistent with the view that perceived emotion in supposedly
neutral faces induces incidental composite effects, distractors rated as more emotional induced stronger
illusory distortion. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to understand stimulus-specific variation
in composite interference.
The first two experiments employed complementary approaches to study the role of subtle
emotion cues on the composite effect; artificially introducing an emotion signal using image morphing
(Experiment 1), and using the natural variation present in the population of ‘neutral faces’ available in
commonly used face databases (Experiment 2). Nevertheless, the results are convergent; relatively subtle
emotion cues, either intended or unintended, can exert a striking influence on the strength of target
distortions induced by the composite illusion.
4. Experiment 3
The results from Experiment 2 suggest a relationship between the emotion ratings awarded to ostensibly
neutral distractors and the degree of composite distortion induced. However, describing one’s subjective
experience of an unfamiliar illusion is challenging [37]. In Experiment 3, we therefore sought to
2The use of Euclidean distances assumes orthogonal dimensionality. When judging whole-face expressions, ratings of anger and
disgust are known to correlate. Some sign of this association was also seen in the half-face ratings collected in Experiment 2; however,
the correlation was not strong (r= 0.32).
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determine whether variation in perceived emotion present in ostensibly neutral faces also modulates
performance on a sequential matching composite procedure. In Experiment 1, we employed the original
matching design, whereby the distractor regions always differ [8]. However, in Experiment 3, we
employed a congruency procedure that also included trials where distractors were the same. Some
authors have speculated that this design measures composite-face effects in a way that attenuates
the influence of response bias [38] (for a different view see [8]). For the sake of clarity, we provide
supplementary analyses of those trials where the distractors differ (the original design). We note,
however, that these results suggest a similar conclusion to those obtained with the full congruency
design. An inverted control condition was also employed to confirm that the effects of alignment are
orientation sensitive [10].
4.1. Material and methods
4.1.1. Participants
Twenty naive adults (Mage= 27.2; s.d.age= 4.7; five males) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in Experiment 3. Ethical clearance was granted by the local ethics committee and the study
was conducted in line with the ethical guidelines laid down in the 6th (2008) Declaration of Helsinki. All
participants gave informed consent.
4.1.2. Stimuli
Eighteen distractor halves were selected from the 50 used in Experiment 2. The nine judged closest to
true neutral were selected for use in the low perceived emotion condition, and the nine judged furthest
from true neutral were selected for use in the high perceived emotion condition. Once more, we note
that all 18 were cropped from supposedly ‘neutral’ faces. Eighteen target halves were sourced from the
Karolinska [34] and Radboud databases [30], including the four used in Experiment 2. Facial composites
subtended approximately 6° vertically when viewed at 58 cm. A thin grey line (approx. 4 pixels) was
inserted in between the target and distractor to guide participants’ judgements.
4.1.3. Procedure
On each trial, observers were asked to indicate whether the target halves of two sequentially
presented composites were the same or different, in the presence of distractor halves that were
either identical or different, and either high or low in perceived emotion. Two control manipulations
were employed; an inverted condition, where both composites were presented upside-down, and a
misaligned condition, where target and distractor halves were offset horizontally by approximately
3° (figure 3a). In total, there were 576 experimental trials: 18 target combinations× 2 target types
(same, different)× 2 distractor types (same, different)× 2 levels of perceived emotion (high, low)× 2
orientations (upright, inverted)× 2 alignments (aligned, misaligned). All trial types were randomly
interleaved. The experiment lasted 35 min and was separated into 10 blocks. The experiment was
programed in MATLAB with PSYCHTOOLBOX extensions [32,33].
Presenting every possible target-distractor pairing in each of the different conditions would have
necessitated a prohibitive number of experimental trials. While everyone judged the same 18 target
combinations on the same trials (i.e. all 18 target halves), each participant judged a different set of 18
target combinations on the different trials. Distractor halves were assigned pseudo-randomly. Where
different distractors were employed on a trial, they were chosen from the same emotion condition (half
high perceived emotion; half low perceived emotion). For 50% of the same trials, the targets were paired
with the same distractor (congruent-same trials); for the remaining same trials, targets were paired with
different distractors (incongruent-same trials). For 50% of the different trials, targets were paired with
the same distractor (incongruent-different trials); for the remaining different trials, targets were paired
with different distractors (congruent-different trials).
4.2. Results and discussion
Target halves (Tsame, Tdifferent) and distractor halves (Dsame, Ddifferent) were combined in a complete
factorial design, yielding four possible trial types (figure 3b): congruent-same (Tsame, Dsame),
incongruent-same (Tsame, Ddifferent), congruent different (Tdifferent, Ddifferent), and incongruent-different
(Tdifferent, Dsame). On congruent trials, composite effects are thought to aid observers’ performance
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(identical distractors facilitate ‘same’ decisions about identical targets; different distractors facilitate
‘different’ decisions about non-identical targets). On incongruent trials, composite effects are thought
to impair observers’ performance (identical distractors hinder ‘different’ decisions about non-identical
targets; different distractors hinder ‘same’ decisions about identical targets). In this congruency
design, composite effects are therefore indexed by a disproportionate effect of congruency (congruent,
incongruent) when composites are upright and aligned, relative to inverted or misaligned conditions
(e.g. [21,39]). For each cell in the design (emotion× orientation× alignment), we therefore estimated
observers’ discrimination sensitivity on congruent and incongruent trials through the calculation of d’
statistics [40].
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Table 1. Results of the ANOVAs performed on the high and low perceived emotion conditions in Experiment 3. (Values in bold indicate
significant values.)
high perceived emotion low perceived emotion
F p η2p F p η
2
p
congruency 2.51 0.130 0.12 4.29 0.052 0.18
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
orientation 14.28 0.001 0.43 10.69 0.004 0.36
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
alignment 0.09 0.767 0.01 3.93 0.062 0.17
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency× orientation 12.86 0.002 0.40 1.23 0.282 0.06
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency× alignment 5.80 0.026 0.23 0.15 0.710 0.01
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
orientation× alignment 0.078 0.784 0.01 0.09 0.770 0.01
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency× orientation× alignment 22.23 <0.001 0.54 4.53 0.047 0.19
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
upright
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency 9.45 0.006 0.33 5.15 0.035 0.21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
alignment 0.150 0.703 0.01 2.51 0.130 0.12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency× alignment 16.91 0.001 0.47 2.12 0.162 0.10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
inverted
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency 2.72 0.120 0.13 0.63 0.438 0.03
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
alignment 0.004 0.950 0.00 1.53 0.230 0.07
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
congruency× alignment 2.07 0.170 0.10 3.44 0.079 0.15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Significant composite effects, indicated by characteristic congruency× orientation× alignment
interactions, were seen in both the high (F1,19= 22.23, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.54) and low (F1,19= 4.53, p= 0.047,
η2p = 0.19) perceived emotion conditions (table 1 and figure 4). Critically, however, composite effects were
larger when distractors contained high levels of perceived emotion (F1,19= 4.56, p= 0.046, η2p = 0.41).
This interaction with emotion was driven by sensitivity differences in the upright conditions, indicated
by a significant emotion× congruency× alignment interaction (F1,19= 6.25, p= 0.02, η2p = 0.25). When
composites were upright and aligned there was also an emotion× congruency interaction (F1,19= 9.30,
p= 0.007, η2p = 0.33). Importantly, none of the interactions with emotion reached significance when
composites were inverted or misaligned (all F’s < 2.6; all p’s > 1.2). When the composites were presented
upright and aligned, effects of congruency were observed in both the high (t19= 6.0, p< 0.001) and low
(t19= 2.98, p= 0.008) perceived emotion conditions. Observers’ sensitivity differed significantly for the
high and low emotion distractors on the congruent trials (t19= 3.08, p= 0.006), but not on the incongruent
trials, (t19= 1.29, p= 0.21).
5. General discussion
The findings from these complementary experiments indicate that subtle facial emotion cues exert a
striking influence on the strength of the composite-face effect. In our first experiment, we found that
composite interference grew stronger as the strength of the emotion signal present in the distractor
increased. Critically, effects of distractor emotion were induced by relatively weak cues (only 50% of
the full emotion intensity), and were incidental insofar as emotion cues hindered image matching, not
emotion labelling or categorization per se. Next, we examined whether perceived emotion cues present
in ostensibly neutral faces, are strong enough to modulate composite interference in a similar way. We
found a correlation between the strength of perceived emotion cues (rated by one set of participants)
and the strength of illusory distortion induced (assessed by different participants) in a set of 50 ‘neutral’
distractors taken from commonly used face databases. In Experiment 3, we compared the composite
effects induced by ostensibly neutral distractors rated high and low for perceived emotion, measured
using a sequential matching task. We found significantly larger composite effects were induced by the
emotion-rich distractors; strikingly, the characteristic interaction effect was more than twice as strong in
the high perceived emotion condition.
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Different learning traditions have converged on the principle that the degree of covariation between
stimulus elements determines whether they will be grouped together [41,42]. Crucially, facial emotions
are known to comprise highly correlated feature changes [43]. Exposure to this covariation may therefore
provide a strong basis for inter-feature perceptual prediction [44,45], and underlie the compelling
composite distortion induced by facial emotion [5,17,18]. The identity [7], age [14] and gender [15]
composite effects may have a similar origin; for example, in our day-to-day environment, the presence
of a male mouth reliably predicts the presence of male eyes. We speculate that the strength of illusory
distortion induced by different composite arrangements may be determined by the strength of these
cross-feature contingencies.3 Subtle expression cues may exert a strong influence on the composite-
face effect because of the striking statistical regularities seen in facial expressions [43]. We note that
composite effects have recently been reported with expressive body postures [46], but not for neutral
body shapes [47]. The highly coordinated nature of whole body actions may also underlie the composite
effects seen in this domain.
The present results suggest that composite effects measured in sequential image-matching paradigms
probably reflect illusory interference induced by both expression and structure cues. We are not in a
position to determine whether these sources of distortion interact or combine additively. Insofar as facial
structure and facial expression are largely independent sources of facial variation [48,49], perceptual
predictions derived from structure and expression cues may also be relatively independent [5].
Nevertheless, illusory distortion induced by expression cues may hinder the matching of targets based
on facial identity. Observers experience well documented difficulties encoding the facial structure of
unfamiliar faces [50–52]. For example, when asked to sort photographs of two unfamiliar individuals
according to the identity of those depicted, observers perform poorly, frequently attributing the
photographs to eight or more different individuals [53]. Deriving an expression-invariant description
of unfamiliar faces poses a particular challenge; when viewing a single image, it is often impossible to
determine whether a stranger is scowling or has narrow eyes. In light of the difficulties partitioning facial
variance according to structure and expression, expression distortions may affect identity matching for
unfamiliar faces.
Previous research has revealed that perceived emotion can exert a strong influence on the judgements
we make about the character traits of others. For example, the detection of anger and happiness
may be responsible for trait judgements of dominance and trustworthiness inferred spontaneously
from supposedly neutral faces [26,54]. Consistent with this view, observers who have difficulties
interpreting facial emotion, make unusual trait judgements about neutral faces [55]. The current findings
further illustrate the unexpected effects that unintended emotion cues may exert on the perception
of ‘emotionless’ faces. Such cues may not only influence the judgement of character traits but may
modulate the extent to which faces are processed holistically. Interestingly, the present findings suggest
the possibility that highly trustworthy and highly dominant faces may tend to produce large composite
effects, insofar as both may be rich in perceived emotion cues (see also [56]).
We have argued that subtle emotion cues present in distractor regions exert a striking influence on
the strength of composite-face effects, possibly because of the strength of the inter-feature contingencies
present in manifest facial expressions. However, some readers might query whether emotion cues
modulate composite effects via another route. If the presence of emotion cues made the distractor
regions more salient, they may have impaired matching through generic distraction, rather than
distortion induced by the composite-face illusion. Two of our findings speak against this alternative
account. First, generic distraction effects should be relatively insensitive to the alignment manipulation.
Crucially, however, we only saw effects of emotion when distractor regions were aligned; the presence
of emotion had little effect when distractors were misaligned. Second, effects of emotion were
seen when participants were asked to rate the strength of the illusory distortion without any time
pressure (Experiment 2). Distraction effects might conceivably impair sequential matching ability where
arrangements are presented very briefly. In Experiment 2, however, participants could take as long as
they wished to compare the target aligned with the distractor, and the target presented in isolation.
A further possibility that warrants discussion is the suggestion that the increased strength of the
composite illusion was not attributable to facial emotion per se. Instead, some distractor regions with
unusual or distinctive facial structure were perhaps more likely to be perceived as emotional; for
3Upper face halves are commonly used as distractor regions in composite paradigms insofar as mouth-to-eye interference is typically
far stronger than eye-to-mouth interference. Interestingly, this asymmetry potentially accords with a feature covariation account.
Predictions made about the eye region based on the state of the mouth region may be more reliable than the predictions made about
the mouth region based on the state of the eye region. By way of comparison, when English readers encounter the letter ‘Q’ in a
sentence, there is a strong likelihood that the next letter will be ‘U’. Conversely, when the letter ‘U’ is encountered, it is less likely that
the preceding letter will be ‘Q’.
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Figure 5. Examples of facial composites taken from a popular stimulus set developed by Le Grand and co-workers [20]. This set has been
widely used to investigate holistic processing in typical and atypical populations [17,22,63–66]. While composites are constructed with
ostensibly neutral faces, subtle emotion cues are present in many of the arrangements. These unintended emotion cues, together with
the absence of a gap between the target and distractor regions [31], may contribute to the large effect sizes seen with this set.
example, ambiguous face shapes may be more receptive to a high-emotion perceptual interpretation.
Thus, apparent modulation by facial emotion may have been driven by underlying facial structure
variation. Again, however, features of our data speak against this view. First, in Experiment 1 we found
that increasing the strength of the emotion signal present on the same facial identities can increase the
strength of the composite illusion. In this situation, there is little possibility that perceived emotion is
confounded with facial structure. This finding confirms that effects of emotion can be seen independently
of facial structure. Second, it is evident from Experiment 2 that perceived emotion cues are present in a
great many ‘neutral’ distractor regions sourced from popular face databases. It seems unlikely that all of
these faces are unusual or distinctive. Rather, it appears that posing expressions which are truly emotion
neutral may be a formidable challenge for actors of all face shapes.
The present results have important implications for researchers using the composite-face paradigm
to investigate holistic processing in typical and atypical populations. Previous studies comparing
individuals’ susceptibility to the composite illusion and other markers of holistic processing, notably the
part-whole effect [57], have yielded inconsistent findings [58–60]. The relationship between observers’
susceptibility to the composite-face effect and their face recognition ability also remains uncertain
[22,58–62]. These mixed results have cast doubt on the functional significance of holistic face processing
as measured by the composite paradigm [9]. Crucially, however, many widely used stimulus sets
contain composites rich in facial emotion (figure 5). While these sets may yield strong replicable
composite effects, individual differences may be less likely to correlate with susceptibility to the
part-whole effect and measures of face recognition ability. Instead, the present results raise the
possibility that individual differences in illusion susceptibility may sometimes correlate with measures of
expression recognition.
The present results also have implications for the study of holistic face processing in atypical
populations. For example, some authors have found that observers with autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) exhibit broadly typical composite-face effects [63], whereas other findings indicate abnormal
processing of facial composites [67]. Importantly, however, there is considerable heterogeneity within
the ASD population in terms of expression recognition [68,69]. This variability may help explain the
inconsistent performance of ASD samples on composite-face tasks. Similarly, cases of developmental
prosopagnosia (DP) have been described who exhibit typical composite effects despite severe face
recognition difficulties [64,70]. However: (i) it is known that many DPs exhibit good expression
recognition [71,72], and (ii) the composite stimuli used in these studies include salient emotion cues.
 on May 30, 2017http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
12
rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.4:160867
................................................
It is unclear, therefore, whether these individuals exhibit intact holistic face processing per se, or intact
holistic processing of facial emotion.
Finally, several authors have sought to investigate the origin and specificity of the composite effect by
comparing the strength of illusory interference induced by faces and other types of object [73]. However,
the strength of the face composite effect will probably depend on the degree of perceived emotion present
in the arrangement. When contrasting the size of composite effects induced by the binding of face shape
with those seen for rigid non-face objects-of-expertise, such as ‘Greebles’ [74], authors should seek to
exclude perceived emotion cues from their face arrangements; i.e. to ensure binding is based solely on the
covariation of structure cues in the stimulus classes compared. We speculate that animating to-be-learned
items with coordinated patterns of global change—mirroring the correlated dynamics of whole body
actions and facial expressions—may increase the strength of composite interference seen with non-face
objects-of-expertise.
The results from the three experiments described indicate that perceived emotion cues modulate
the strength of the composite-face effect when stimulus arrangements are constructed from supposedly
‘neutral’ faces. These results have important implications for research addressing holistic processing in
typical and atypical populations. Understanding the contribution of perceived emotion to inter-stimulus
variability may help reveal the relationship between composite interference, other markers of holistic
face processing, and face recognition ability.
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